

Human-Centric National Security in Strong States: South Korea's Security Relations to North Korea

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Human-Centric National Security in Strong States: A New Pathway for Human Security

Abstract

When the Cold War ended, the international community had high hopes for global peace and security. However, such optimism has been shaken by a series of grave crises, including terrorism, ethnic cleansing, epidemics, and nuclear crises. These new threats are mostly *human security* threats that pose national security risks even to strong states. Thus, the *demand* for human security by *security consumers* – i.e., citizens – has skyrocketed, while national security institutions' *supply* of human security has not satisfied this demand, largely due to the traditional orientation of national security towards “regime-centric security.” Although the concept of “human security” developed by the United Nations provides a useful starting point, current definitions of human security have serious limitations that have kept human security out of mainstream discussions about strong states' national security. This separation is both illogical and impractical, because not only has the public demand for human security increased, but the potential role of the public in security processes has also grown. Recognizing these new realities, this paper reconsiders both human security and national security, bringing the “human” back into the study of *national security* while also incorporating the state as a critical institution for *human security*. The result of this integration of national security and human security is a new framework, “human-centric national security,” with three distinct dimensions: security *of* humans, *for* humans, and *by* humans. Furthermore, to apply this new analytic framework to the real world, this paper reviews the national security policies of South Korea vis-à-vis North Korea for the period 1990-2017. Using this new framework, this paper examines the usefulness of the concept of human security as a way out of the strategic dilemma facing South Korea: whether North Korea should be defined primarily as an *enemy* to kill or a *brother* to “hug.” This paper shows that “human security,” if reframed as “human-centric national security,” *can* be fundamentally integrated into national security policies and can thus contribute to a strong state's national security and to international peace, facilitate more coherent active engagement policies, and produce better security outputs.

Key Words: National Security, Human Security, International Security, Northeast Asia, North Korea, South Korea

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1. Introduction

In the wake of new military conflicts and tensions in the early 21st century, discussions around the concept of human security have diminished in the mainstream discourse on international security and peace. Global society seems to be losing hope that, through human security, societies can progress towards international peace and human development. Even among strong advocates of human security such as Canada and Japan, the concept has lost its previous status in their foreign policies.¹ Moreover, even in the United Nations, human security now goes almost completely unmentioned in public discussions (Lee Shin-wha, 2004: 21-22). Though part of the human security agenda goes on via R2P (responsibility to protect) and global climate change, “human security” appears to have lost its early momentum as a path for pursuing global peace and human development together. As Ken Booth (2008: 323) notes, the concept of human security has had little impact so far on the way sovereign states behave. Is then the concept of human security almost useless for policy development in national and international security?

In fact, casting “human security” aside is both illogical and impractical in today's social context and security environment. The public's demand for human security has not decreased, but increased, and global awareness of human security threats has grown stronger.² Individuals are more empowered. Security threats are more globalized or transnationalized. It is irrational for the concept of “human security” to diminish in public discourse while the demand for it is becoming stronger, even if the original proponents were too naïve to capture the “reality” of national security when they first advocated it.

There are two main reasons why human security is now considered only a marginal topic for national security discussions, especially with regard to “hard security” issues between *strong* states. First, human security is often considered non-traditional security or “soft security,” which addresses issues other than external military threats. In contrast, the term “national security” is largely understood to be “synonymous with external defense of national borders” (Kaldor, 2012: 187). Second, when it is occasionally applied to “hard security,” human security is applied only to humanitarian intervention or R2P in fragile states. As a result, human security is not counted as part of the *traditional* national security of *strong* states, nor as part of international security between them.

The current disconnect between human security and national security for strong states can also be attributed to a bias among human security analysts, who tend not to regard traditional national security as a human security topic. As a result, their discussions are largely anchored by two issues only: first, humanitarian intervention in

1 Human security has been removed from the official foreign policies of Canada since Prime Minister Harper took office in 2006. Japan, which had promoted human security as one of the main pillars of its foreign policy, has also downgraded human security to an ODA (overseas development aid) policy since 2003 (Edström, 2003: 152-154).

2 The public's awareness of global affairs is facilitated by multiple factors, such as the revolutionary improvement of information technology and transportation, the growth of educated populations (especially the global middle class), and the increasing activities of civil society. These factors are related to the global trend of “individual empowerment” (NIC 2012).

response to the fragmentation and decentralization of states, and second, organized responses to non-military threats such as epidemics. If the second reason is the primary focus, then “human safety” might be a more precise expression than “human security.”

If human security proponents continue to forget the “national security of strong states,” the disconnection between human security and national security analysts will continue. As a result, human security will continue to be ignored in discussions on national and international security. I hope to bridge the current gap between human security and national security by recalling the fundamental definitions of “national security” and “human security.” For instance, although *raison d'état* or “reason of state” is a long-standing principle of national security, the state is fundamentally a *human* society; therefore, the fundamental mission of national security is to protect humans rather than territory or regime. *This is identical to the generic meaning of human security.*

In this paper, I reject the dichotomy between human security and national security. By considering both theoretical and practical problems, I develop a framework of national security *based on* human security, particularly for strong states under traditional security threats. From a national security perspective, the demand for human security is generally equivalent to “new” or non-traditional types of threats that have become increasingly salient in the 21st century, so it is almost inarguable that the demand for human security has increased. If we also see that one nation’s narrow nationalism hurts others’ security and thus increases the risk of war, we must in turn recall why the state exists and what goals national security must pursue.

My discussion of human security for national security – and national security for human security – is a humble but hopefully meaningful initial attempt to apply human security to a framework for national security in today's new social context and new strategic environment. Individual citizens are more empowered and want to keep “ownership” of their state, even as society has become global. Moreover, many states face both *old* and *new* threats. *Old* threats consist mainly of traditional military threats, which come mostly from other states, while *new* threats are non-traditional threats, which often come from non-state actors or non-human sources.

In response to such increasingly complicated security *demands*, national governments must be able to *supply* appropriate national security services to their citizens. To supply national security policies that meet human security demands, national governments need to rethink the concept of national security and develop a new framework with which to supply national security. The framework I call “human-centric national security” provides an analytical tool for security analysts and others to determine if national security policies are aligned with the demand for human security.

2. The Analytic Framework of *Human-Centric National Security*

2.1. My Challenge to Mainstream Human Security Concepts: Criticize the Binary

Most of the literature on human security and national security keeps the *binary* typology that separates the two concepts. As MacFarlane and Khong (2006: 23) note, “human security is an assertion of the rights and needs of the individual independently of, and sometimes in contradiction to, those of the state.” This binary concept is rooted in the UNDP’s initial argument: the traditional concepts of security emphasize the state as the referent object to be secured, while the concepts of human security put the individual human as the referent object of security. Acharya’s table below is a generally accepted understanding of the complementary and often conflicting relationship between national security and human security. Some scholars of human security even argue that human security is more “advantageous” than traditional national security. Tow and Trood (2000) argue to favor human security *over* national security.

Figure #1: Four Images of Security (Acharya, 2001: 453)

		Attention to Threat	
		Physical Violence	Physical Violence + Non-military
Attention to Unit	Individual	Personal Security	Human Security
	State	National Security	Comprehensive Security

While I mostly agree with their points regarding the benefits of “human security,” I dispute the binary relationship between human security and national security.

The conceptual segregation of human security from national security is based on the *binary* framework of “human security *versus* national security,” rather than an integrative framework such as “human security *for* national security” or “national security *for* human security.”³ Though the binary typology is useful for theoretical purposes, it misleads security analysts into thinking that human security and national security are mutually exclusive.

The binary framework of “human security *versus* national security” is inappropriate for two reasons. First, national security, by definition, gives the state the primary role of protecting humans – specifically, its citizens – against all forms of national crises. If human security does not recognize the crucial role of the national government, then human security loses its practical value, because security resources are mainly under the control of the national government. *Replacing* national security with human security would be not only unrealistic but also illogical in the contemporary world. In discussions of human security, therefore, it is not appropriate to project the

³ Compare Figure #1 with Figure #2.

condition of fragile states, whose national security is malfunctioning or misused for political elites, on states generally.

Second, human security cannot function as an independent operational concept without the resources and institutions necessary for implementation. Instead, human security can and should be a *foundation for* national security. Without politically legitimate and sustainable agencies dedicated to the mission, human security would be very limited in its application, and this limited application would in turn weaken national security. However, if national security were considered a path to human security, then national security would become an operational concept for human security.

Accordingly, my suggested framework integrates human security *with* national security. I call this framework “human-centric national security.” In this framework, human security is not a *replacement* for national security, but a fundamental *goal* of national security as well as an effective *pathway* to national security. This framework enables national security and long-term strategic analyses to better facilitate “human development,” because human security is also rooted in human development. The framework also clarifies how military security is related to national security and human security, as shown in Figure #2. Within the framework of human-centric national security, human security, national security, and global security are interdependent.


2.2. Human-Centric National Security as a New Framework

“Human-centric national security” is a new framework of national security designed to achieve human security and secure the nation. In particular, it resolves conceptual conflicts inherent in the binary of national security *versus* human security. It differs from non-traditional security (NTS) in that NTS is a regime-centric framework for “soft” security, whereas human-centric national security also addresses “hard” security issues.

The framework of human-centric national security can encourage “realist” national security analysts to fundamentally rethink what the best strategy for serving their national interests might be. Under this framework, national security can better serve individual citizens by restoring the original relationship between human security as the *ends* and national security as the *means*.

Figure #2: The Integrative Concept of *Human-Centric National Security*

Human-Centric National Security:
Rethinking *National Security* from *Human Security* Perspectives



2.2.1. The Definition of Human-Centric National Security

I define “**human-centric national security**” as a framework of national security by which the state puts the priority of its security policies on the protection of the life and dignity of individual humans from both military and non-military threats and recognizes individual citizens and their communities as significant actors participating in the planning and implementation of national security policies. As such, “human-centric national security” is an analytical framework of national security for human security that has three essential dimensions: security of humans, for humans, and by humans.

On the one hand, human-centric national security is a kind of human security approach, but one which differs from the currently popular concept of Human Security in two key ways. First, human-centric national security rejects the understanding of human security based on the binary of human *versus* national security. Human-centric national security recognizes the state authority as the primary provider and executor of national and international security policies. Within the framework of human-centric national security, the reinterpreted concept of human security supports national security, and vice versa. Second, unlike the currently popular concept of Human Security, human-centric national security is not always focused on non-military security. Human-centric national security is not synonymous with soft security.

On the other hand, human-centric national security is a kind of national security approach, but one which, again, differs from traditional concepts of national security or state security. Unlike the concept of regime-centric state security, human-centric national security embraces human security perspectives. Human-centric national security takes what I call a *microsecurity* approach.⁴ It treats national or international security as

4 I create the new term “*micro-security*” and define it as “security of humans.” This is a *micro*-level interpretation of security, in contrast to regime-centric security or structural realist understandings of security. In contrast to *macro* perspectives, *micro* perspectives make it easier to identify and understand

“security of individual humans,” in contrast to what I call *macrosecurity*, the structural view of national or international security.⁵ I argue that better analysis of national security needs both *macro* and *micro* perspectives, just as Anthony Giddens (1984) argues that social scientists must look at both social structure and individual actors in order to see the whole picture. Human-centric national security carries *microsecurity* perspectives, while traditional national security retains mostly *macrosecurity* perspectives.

“Human-centric national security” may sound like “comprehensive security,” as both concepts pay attention to both military and non-military threats. However, these two concepts are fundamentally different from each other. “Comprehensive security” means “security *for* people” but fails to recognize “security *by* people,” which is a key element of human security. In contrast, human-centric (national) security means not only the “security *for* people,” but also the “security *by* people” [non-state actors and civil society] in national security policy and practice. “Human-centric national security” pays more attention to individuals and their *capabilities* than does “comprehensive security.” These issues are discussed in more detail below.

As noted above, “human-centric national security” is also fundamentally different from “non-traditional security (NTS), because unlike the concept of non-traditional security, human-centric national security can also address traditional military threats.

2.2.2. Three Premises for Human-Centric National Security

“Human-centric national security” starts from three fundamental premises:

- 1) Humans feel secure when their routine daily civilian life is not seriously disrupted by either human and non-human threats;
- 2) States are not human, so a state’s regime must exist *for* its citizens;
- 3) Humans can shape and change their social structure and state regime, while also being affected and constrained by the social structure and regime.⁶

If a national security policy is not compatible with any of the three premises, then that policy cannot be considered “human-centric national security.”

both external and internal security dynamics, which can be affected by the power of individual actors, even though such actors' power projection is less predictable than unitary states.

5 I create the new term “*macro*-security” and define it to be the *macro*-level interpretation of security, focusing on state-to-state, regime-to-regime interactions as well as on international structure. Focused as they are on states and structure, *macro* perspectives tend to ignore the individual agent’s ability to change the structure or produce outputs different from those predetermined by the structure. In international relations scholarship, state-centric realists tend to understand national security as a “chess game” between unitary states. Though the *macro* view is still useful, it incurs a considerable opportunity cost in understanding the security dynamics of both the external and internal environments of national security.

6 The third premise posits an endogenous model for social change, not just an exogenous model.

2.2.3. Three Dimensions of Human-Centric National Security

Based on these three premises, “human-centric national security” can be understood from three angles: security *of* humans, security *for* humans, and security *by* humans. Understanding these three dimensions is essential for “dissecting” the concept of human security, which is too ambiguous to be applied to national security.

The first dimension, “security of humans,” refers to a *microsecurity* approach focusing on the individual human. “Individual human” does not mean any particular person, but rather the rational human as an analytical unit, much like microeconomics analyzes the rational individual in a theoretical market. This orientation allows us to specify “security” from the perspective of individual humans. In other words, “security of humans” means “security” based on an understanding of what threatens humans *fear* – and how humans respond to such threats. This level of analysis helps us incorporate what “security” means to individual humans into a new national security framework. Thus, “security of humans” requires the state to consider what kinds of threats are recognized by individual humans.

“Security of humans” also includes understanding both security “consumers” and security threats on the basis of “cognitive empathy”: a value-free, “inside-out” understanding of other humans that implies *recognition* but not necessarily *sympathy* (Hodges and Myers: 296-298). For example, to defeat terrorists, security officials need to understand terrorists’ intentions, goals, and world-views well; however, such precise understanding of terrorists is wholly different from sympathy towards them. In this paper, the word “empathy” is used in this way to refer to value-free apprehension of other humans’ mindsets, rather than “value-laden” sympathy and comity.⁷ As such, I use this concept interchangeably with “*inside-out* understanding.” The benefit of *value-free* empathy or *inside-out* understanding of both the security referent and the opponent is that it allows us to understand each one in a more scientific and objective way – *as it is*.

Following from the above discussion, the dimension “security of humans” assesses a state's national security policy by asking the following three questions: 1) Are human security threats recognized? 2) Are security threats analyzed empathetically and *as they are*? 3) Does the analysis of national security threats include not only international, but also transnational, threats?

The second dimension, “security for humans” refers to the interpretation of the security referent. This framework provides legitimacy and moral authority to the state and its national security policies. However, the moral legitimacy of any national security policy is so highly subjective that even historically brutal dictators have used rhetoric claiming to promote national security for the citizens. In extreme cases, such as some past fascist regimes, rhetoric can go so far as to interpret national interests so narrowly and radically that even the term “human” is redefined to include only the members of that nation, and thus “national security” can become a justification for aggression against other states and massive killing of foreigners.

To overcome the analytical challenges posed by such a slippery concept, my framework considers a state's actions, not just its rhetoric, assessing them in terms of universal human values, rather than narrow nationalism. The focus on actions is to distinguish “security for humans” from “security for the regime.” The point of this

7 “Value-laden” sympathy and comity are part of “security for humans,” discussed next.

dimension is to determine if a state integrates “universal humanity,” into its national security framework and embraces norms of international human rights. An additional purpose of such analysis is to determine if a state's national security framework also embraces human development.

Defined as such, the dimension of “security for humans” assesses a state's national security policy by asking the following three questions: 1) Is the principle of “security for humans” stated clearly in the state's national security doctrine? 2) Is human development recognized in its national security framework? 3) Do the state's policy actions target the “hearts and minds” of people?⁸

The third dimension, “security by humans,” refers to security actors and relevant security management systems. The framework of human-centric national security is based on belief in the individual’s intelligence and power to shape and change the social structure and regime. The framework of “security by humans” assesses whether human/national security information is easily accessible by citizens, whether non-state actors are recognized by the government as partners in security policy design, and whether citizens’ participation in policy development is encouraged.

A central aspect of this dimension is whether or not national security affairs are monopolized by the government and based on highly exclusive, unilateral, top-down approaches by the government towards its citizens. Given the increasing information and material power of individuals in the twenty-first century, a state's national security framework needs to take full account and advantage of democratic, inclusive, interactive, and bottom-up approaches in relation to its citizens.

“Security *by humans*” does not mean that the individual denies the state as the principal actor in national and international security. Rather, the state in human-centric national security is a platform on which individuals can create what they want. To do so, the state must be an “inclusive” platform that is not monopolized by a closed circle of political elites. Regarding the role of state in security, the framework of human-centric national security agrees with the Hobbesian premise that a strong state is probably the most effective way for humans to establish their human security, whether from internal disorder or external enemies. Even today, many people in fragile states struggle to build their regime strong enough to create more secure environments for their daily lives. Empirical research by Daron Acemoglu of MIT and James Robinson of University of Chicago “fragile states” demonstrates that state failure or state dysfunction is the primary source of human insecurity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In their book *Fixing Failed States* Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (2008) clarify the state’s two basic functions: 1) rule of law, and 2) monopoly on the use of violence. In observing the reality of failed states, they go as far as to declare, “...the [free] market is not the product of the invisible hand, but an institution created and nurtured by a visible hand under the rule of law (ibid: xiii).”

On this basis, the dimension of “security by humans” assesses a state's national security policy by asking the following three questions: 1) Are the state's national security decision processes and systems largely open to its citizens? 2) Does the government consider non-state actors to be its partners as security *suppliers*, not just security *consumers*? 3) Do non-state actors participate actively in national security affairs?

8 “People” here refers to two groups: 1) one’s own citizens as security consumers; 2) other humans living in foreign countries, including enemy states or groups.

The Table 1 provides a summary of the three dimensions of human-centric national security.

Table 1: Three Dimensions of Human-Centric National Security

Dimension Focus		Description	Key Questions	Contrasting Points in Concept Discussion
Security <i>of</i> Humans	Security Definition and Threat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value-free, “inside-out” understanding of both security consumers and security threats • Scope of security threats: human and non-human sources • <i>Micro</i>-view of the ‘mission’ of security: Ontological Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human security threats are recognized? • Security threat is analyzed “as it is”? • Ontological security for the individual citizen is embedded in national security? 	<i>Macro vs. Micro</i> view; Supplier mindset <i>vs.</i> Consumer mindset; State <i>vs.</i> Non-state Threats; Military <i>vs.</i> Non-military threats
Security <i>for</i> Humans	Security Referent (Security Consumer Base)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimacy and Moral basis of national security: Values-based understanding of the mission of security • Integration of human rights and human development into the mission of national security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human development and human rights is integrated into national security? • Hearts and minds of people are targeted⁹? 	Destroy the opponent’s regime <i>vs.</i> Secure hearts & minds
Security <i>by</i> Humans	Security Actors (Management System)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Belief in the individual’s intelligence and power to shape and change the social structure and the regime • Recognition of non-state and transnational actors as security <i>suppliers</i>, not merely as security <i>consumers</i> • Democratic process to integrate non-state actors to national security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security policy decision processes and systems and security information are accessible to citizens? • Non-state actors participate actively in national security through democratic process? 	Monopolized <i>vs.</i> Democratic System; Exclusive <i>vs.</i> Inclusive Institution; Unilateral <i>vs.</i> Interactive Process; Top-down <i>vs.</i> Bottom-up Approach

⁹ Humanitarian considerations and human rights of people other than one’s own citizens.

3. Case: South Korea's Security Relations to North Korea

3.1. Background Information of South Korea's Relations to North Korea

South Korea is an example of a strong state that faces serious traditional military threats from external enemies. The two Koreas had a major war for 1950-1953 that killed hundreds of thousands of people. Their armed confrontation has continued since then, and North Korea is without question South Korea's most threatening enemy. However, because of their common Korean ethnicity, many South Koreans also regard North Koreans as "brothers."¹⁰ The contrasting and mixed perceptions among South Koreans regarding North Korea have created a situation in which no policy approach towards North Korea, whether "hard" or "soft," has yet succeeded in either eliminating the national security threat or building a consensus-based national security policy. Rather, given that the North's provocative nuclear weapons development has continued to escalate, the value of South Korean national security policy outputs to date is questionable at best. Indeed, the very existence of the nation is now threatened by the growing nuclear arsenal of North Korea, and the security situation has continued to worsen during the Trump administration due to mutual escalation of military threats between the United States and North Korea. Rising military tension between China and the United States has also contributed to the deterioration of the external security environment of South Korea.

My analysis of Korea focuses on the post-Cold War period of 1990-2017, though the transitional period of 1988-1989 is also examined insofar as it is relevant to the post-Cold War period.¹¹ Presidential national security policies are treated as "grand strategies" because South Korea has adopted a U.S.-style presidential system, and South Korea's national security policies vis-à-vis North Korea have differed from one president to another. Administration names are as shown in Table 2, in chronological order:

10 45.9% of South Koreans think that North Korea is enemy rather than brother, according to the survey conducted only three weeks after North Korea's 5th nuclear test in September 2016. (Shindoga at <http://shindonga.donga.com/3/home/13/767020/1>)

11 South Korea opened official diplomatic relations with Russia in 1990 and with China in 1992. Considering this record, my analysis is focused on the period from 1990. However, in 1988-1989, South Korea was already beginning to increase both inter-governmental and non-governmental relations with Russia, China, and other communist states.

Table 2: History of South Korea (ROK)’s National Security Policy vis-à-vis North Korea (DPRK)

Period	Provocative Action by North Korea	South Korean Doctrine	Description	Implementation
1990-1992 Roh, Taewoo		<i>Nordpolitik</i>	Encirclement & Engagement	Engagement through regime competition and encirclement
1993-1994 Kim, Youngsam	NPT withdrawal (1994)		Reactive to DPRK nuclear crisis	Engagement intent was expressed but not implemented during this time of increasing military tension.
1994-1997 Kim, Youngsam		<i>New Diplomacy</i>	Diplomacy towards Korean unification	Ignored by DPRK
1998-2002 Kim, Daejung	Long-range missile test (1998), West Sea battle (1999, 2002)	<i>Sunshine Policy</i>	Active and comprehensive engagement with and embrace of DPRK; internationalism	Active economic cooperation with DPRK, supported by US, Japan, and China. Since 2000, rejection of the U.S. hardline policy.
2003-2007 Roh, Moohyun	NPT withdrawal (2003); 1 st nuclear test and ballistic missile test (2006)	<i>Policy for Peace and Prosperity; Northeast Asia Balancer</i>	Active engagement with and embrace of DPRK; nationalism	Inter-Korean peace prioritized over US-Korea alliance, rejection of the U.S. hardline policy.
2008-2012 Lee, Myungbak	2 nd nuclear test, West Sea battle (2009); ballistic missile test (2009, 2012); Cheonan Naval Ship sinking and Yeonpyong Island bombardment (2010)	<i>Denuclearization & Openness 3000</i>	The principle of reciprocity; engagement with DPRK if denuclearized	Engagement intent was expressed but shifted to sanctions & regime change in response to the DPRK nuclear test and armed conflicts.
2013-2017 Park, Geunhye	3 rd - 6 th nuclear test (2013, 2016, 2017); ICBM tests	<i>Trustpolitik; Northeastern Asia Peace Initiative; Eurasia Initiative</i>	Trust-building engagement, starting with humanitarian support, but based on the principle of reciprocity	Engagement intent was expressed but shifted to sanctions & regime change in response to DPRK continuous nuclear and missile tests.

3.2. Analysis of South Korea's National Security through the Human-Centric Security Framework

3.2.1. Recognition of "Human Security" in Policy Documents

To apply this framework to a strong state with grave "traditional security" problems, the main questions are: "Has human security been integrated into the national security of South Korea, which has been under serious military threat from North Korea? If so, how has it been integrated and what policy output has been produced?"

The South Korean government had not used the term "human security" until politically conservative president Lee Myungbak (2008-2012) brought it up in "Global Korea," his government's national security strategy doctrine. However, the word "human security" was mentioned only once in this document and this term was rarely mentioned elsewhere. Moreover, the term disappeared again during the next administration, that of Park Geunhye (2013-2017). The South Korean national security community has not used the term "human security" mainly because the term "human security" has been understood as "non-traditional security." Any additional reasons for avoiding the term "human security" may be investigated in another research.

In spite of the invisibility of the term "human security" in the national security documents of South Korea, however, "human-centric security" expressions have appeared in official national security strategy documents, especially since Kim Daejung's presidency (1998-2002). Thus, the direct use of the term "human security" is not a reliable indicator for the depth of understanding of human-centric national security. Moreover, the term "human security" was created by the UNDP in 1994, so so naturally the South Korean government did not use the term before 1994.

Noteworthy is that human-centric security concepts are *not* solely the intellectual property of liberals and have not been monopolized solely by liberal presidents. Politically conservative President Roh Taewoo's "Basic Agreement" for reconciliation and the "Joint Declaration" on denuclearization are early examples and were the direct precursors to the Sunshine Policy of liberal President Kim Daejung. Another conservative president, Park Geunhye, also announced "citizen-centered" policies that appeared to be well-connected to the concept of "human security," though her policy actions became very different after North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013. She also tried to employ "non-traditional security" approaches by developing a new strategic initiative, the "Northeast Asia Peace Cooperation Initiative."

3.2.2. Research and Evaluation of Human-Centric National Security

Each president's national security policies are analyzed using the framework of human-centric national security. Official South Korean national security documents – published and implemented by the Office of President (called the Blue House), the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of National Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Unification (MOU) – are reviewed, along with relevant statistical data. In the top-down culture of South Korea's presidential system, particularly in the national security area, presidential announcements regarding strategic direction are the most important documents to be analyzed. To supplement the

analysis of presidential documents, Defense White Papers, Diplomacy White Papers, and Unification White Papers are also analyzed. In addition, the presidents' published memoirs are reviewed, though they are not technically official documents. The memoirs of senior officials who were key architects of the presidential national security are also reviewed when available.¹² However, if a government's policy actions are clearly different from its rhetoric, the former is more considered than the latter.

For the framework of human-centric national security, the Ministry of Unification plays as important a role in national security as the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Kim Daejung designated the MOU as a key agency for the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. The Ministry of Unification has integrated non-military security issues into national security, in preparation for peaceful unification. However, this ministry's influence over national security policy has fluctuated – for example, it was largely subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the presidency of Lee Myungbak.

My qualitative evaluation of each president's policy in terms of human-centric national security is summarized in Table 3.¹³

Table 3: Evaluation of Human-Centric National Security Approaches of South Korea

Dimension	Element	Roh Tae Woo	Kim Young Sam	Kim Dae Jung	Roh Moo Hyun	Lee Myung Bak	Park Geun Hye
Security of Humans	Comprehensive Threat Recognition	Low	Mid	High	High	High	High
	Cognitive Empathy	Mid	Low	High	High	Low	Low
	Ontological Security Concept	Mid	Low	High	High	Low	Mid
Security for Humans	Humanitarian Considerations	High	Mid	High	High	Mid	Mid
	Human Development	High	High	High	High	High	High
Security by Humans	Information Accessibility	Mid	Mid	High	High	Mid	Low
	Participatory Process	Mid	Mid	High	High	Mid	Mid
Overall		Mid	Low	High	High	Low	Low

12 Lim Dongwon and Lee Jongsuk are considered key architects of national security strategies of Presidents Kim Daejung and Roh Moohyun, respectively.

13 Each presidency period was analyzed in detail in my original research: Jang, Jay Jinseop, "Human-Centric National Security in Strong States: South Korea's Security Relations with North Korea" (2017). *Graduate Doctoral Dissertations*. 357. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/doctoral_dissertations/357.

The main focus of this research is to develop a new analytical framework and show its applicability to a real case, South Korea for 1990-2017, rather than to develop a precise measurement method. Therefore, my evaluation method is basically qualitative analysis. However, an absolute-scale scoring index for human-centric national security will be developed through further studies of strong states.

3.2.3. Discussion Point 1: Reverse Policy Actions by Some Presidents

The six presidents are divided into two groups, according to their evaluations in Table 3. As summarized in Table 4, Group B has been more human-centric than Group A in their national security policies. This grouping based on the degree of human-centric security is also consistent with a grouping based on the degree of engagement between two Koreas. Figures 3 to 5 show the overall trends in the degree of engagement between two Koreas over time. Because of the differences in their policy actions, Group A is typically called “hawkish” while Group B is called “dovish.”

However, terms like “hawk” and “dove” are problematic oversimplifications. Both groups pursued engagement policies rather than offensive military strategies. Both groups pursued peace on the Korean peninsula and were cautious about discussing the South’s absorption of the North. Both groups were willing to provide humanitarian support for North Koreans and wanted to improve the human rights of North Koreans. Both groups clearly believed in the principles and values of democracy, as well as the obligation of the state to protect its citizens’ lives and preserve its citizens’ right to access public information. No one in either group preferred military confrontation or pursued offensive action to hasten the North’s regime collapse. In short, both groups appear to express similar messages of the desire for peace, reconciliation, and engagement with North Korea, as summarized in Table 5.

If both groups had similar strategic goals regarding peace and engagement with North Korea, then *why* did Group A’s strategic policy actions turn out to be so different? As summarized in table 4, Group A shows policy actions opposite to their original plans for engagement, suggesting that Group B’s actual policies were more *coherent* and *consistent* overall.

At the surface level, Group A’s deviation from their stated intentions appears to be in response to North Korea’s provocative behaviors. For example, Kim Youngsam reacted to North Korea’s first nuclear crisis in 1994 by changing his policy to a hardline approach. Lee Myungbak tried to “punish” North Korea after the death of a South Korean tourist in 2008, North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, and North Korea’s torpedo attack on Cheonan naval ship in 2010. Park Geunhye abandoned her initial engagement policy and completely terminated inter-Korean economic cooperation in response to North Korea’s 3rd nuclear test in 2013. The sudden drop in the level of engagement in 2016, as shown in graphs in Figure 3 to 4, is a dramatic example of such policy “about-faces.”

However, why did North Korea become “uncontrollable” only to Group A? Group B was not insulated from North Korean provocation, such as the West Sea Battles in 1999 and 2002; nevertheless, Group B was able to control North Korea’s military threat and deescalate military tension when it occurred. In contrast, Group A chose courses of strategic action that ran contrary to their policy goals of reconciliation and peaceful unification.


Table 4: Differences in Policy Priorities Causing Gaps between Plan and Action

Sub-group	Administration	Announced Long-term Strategy (Goal)	Implemented Strategy (Action)	Strategic Priority: Which is More Important for North Korea Policy?
A	Kim Youngsam, Lee Myungbak, Park Geunhye ¹⁴	Engagement, Reconciliation, inter-Korean peace	Containment, Confrontation, Inter-Korean military tension	Unification over Peace; Denuclearization over Talk; Human Rights over Humanitarian Support
B	Roh Taewoo, Kim Daejung, Roh Moohyun		Engagement, Reconciliation, Inter-Korean Peace	Peace over Unification; Talk over Denuclearization; Humanitarian Support over Human Rights

Table 5: Inter-Korean Engagement Level

Subgroup	Administration	Policy Announcement	Actual Engagement Level
A	Kim Youngsam, Lee Myungbak, Park Geunhye	High Engagement	Decline
B	Roh Taewoo, Kim Daejung, Roh Moohyun	High Engagement	Increase


Figure 3 : Inter-Korean Trade



Source: Unification White Paper 2016 published by The Ministry of Unification, p.289


14 The Park Geunhye Administration tried to differentiate its policy from Lee Myungbak's by offering humanitarian support unconditionally.

Figure 4 : Inter-Korean Visitation: South Koreans Visiting North Korea



Source: The Ministry of Unification (www.unikorea.go.kr)

Figure 5 : Inter-Korean Visitation: North Koreans Visiting South Korea



Source: The Ministry of Unification (www.unikorea.go.kr)

Noteworthy is the difference in doctrine Group A and Group B, which can be traced to different priorities regarding several strategic issues, as summarized in Table 4. The difference in strategic priorities led administrations with similar strategic goals to produce very different policy actions and different outputs. Group A's strategic priorities, such as treating unification as more important than peace, heightened North Korea's fear of regime collapse. Ironically, Group A's strong advocacy of peaceful unification impaired their pathway to peaceful unification, because they were not able to open inter-Korean dialogue as the first step toward peaceful unification. In contrast, Group B's practice of deferring the unification agenda actually increased the prospects of unification because they were able to build inter-Korean peace through more frequent and deeper engagement by both governmental and non-governmental actors.

The root of this irony can be traced clearly using the framework of human-centric national security. As shown in Table 3, cognitive empathy is a major element of human-centric security. Due to a lack of cognitive empathy, Group A misunderstood or ignored the North Korean regime's self-confidence level, which has decreased during the post-

Cold War period, especially after their economy almost collapsed in mid-1990s. The North Korea of today might react defensively or negatively to a South Korean proposal, whereas the North Korea of a decade ago might have reacted positively to the same proposal.

3.2.4. Discussion Point 2: Better National Security Outputs

Which group provided South Korean citizens with better security conditions? In particular, which group’s approach was more effective in controlling North Korea’s military threat? In South Korea, there is no consensus on this issue. However, the framework of human-centric national security provides a way to assess different approaches and brings clarity to this issue.

With the framework of human-centric security, national security can be measured in two ways. First, from an internal or *microsecurity* perspective, how *safe* do citizens feel in terms of having their routine daily lives protected from life-threatening disruptive threats? This is a straightforward output measured by the individual’s perception of “ontological security” from national-level threats. There are a variety of indicators that may be useful for measuring this security output. In the case of South Korea, one such indicator is the number of citizens and soldiers killed or kidnapped by North Korea (Table 6). Another indicator is the level of fear among South Korean citizens regarding military attack by North Korea, as shown in Figure 6. The public’s sense of insecurity was generally low for the period of 1998-2007, and in fact the first summit meeting between Kim Daejung and Kim Jungil in 2000 reduced the public’s sense of insecurity to its lowest point ever, but as tensions between North Korea and the United States increased, the sense of insecurity among South Koreans also increased somewhat.¹⁵ The public’s sense of insecurity also temporarily surged when North Korea withdrew from NPT in 2003 and again when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. After 2007, during the presidency of Lee Myungbak, the public’s sense of insecurity rose to its highest level, and although it decreased substantially in 2012 when incoming president Park Geunhye announced her new engagement doctrine, “trustpolitik,” it shot up again within two months of her taking office. According to both of these indicators, Group B outperformed Group A.


Table 6: South Koreans (Civilian and Soldier) Killed by North Korea; and Nuclear Tests by North Korea.

Subgroup	Human-centric National Security Level	Number of Killed and Kidnapped Citizens (Unit: Person)	Nuclear Tests (Unit: Time)
A	Low	67	4
B	Mid-High	6	1*

Note (*) North Korea’s first nuclear test (2006)

15 G.W. Bush included North Korea I his “axis of evil” in 2001 and terminated the 1994 General Agreement in 2002.

Figure 6: South Korean Public's Sense of Insecurity¹⁶
(Unit: %)




Source: Korea National Defense University's Survey (1998-2003); East Asia Institute's Survey Archive (2004-2012); Jung Hanwool (2013)

Second, externally or from an external or *macrosecurity* perspective, how serious is the external enemy's threat to destroy the nation? In other words, does the enemy state have a powerful capacity for, and a credible intention of, destroying my state? In the case of South Korea, the frequency of nuclear tests by North Korea is a strong indicator, considering both North Korea's hostility against South Korea and the nuclear arsenal's potentially catastrophic consequences for the very existence of South Korea as nation. This indicator also shows more favorable data for Group B than for Group A, as shown in Figure 7.

¹⁶ The level of "insecurity" corresponds to responses of "very insecure" and "insecure" in the multiple-choice survey.


Figure 7: North Korea’s Escalating Nuclear and Missile Tests



Source: *The Atlantic* at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/trump-options-nuclear-north-korea/522075/>

My evaluation of each presidency using the framework of human-centric national security is also consistent with public opinion about which administration provided better security to South Korea, as Figure 8 shows. According to a survey asking South Koreans to choose the president who performed best on national security, Group B’s Roh Moohyun and Kim Daejung were chosen by 36.9% and 37.8%, respectively, while Group A’s Park Geunhye and Lee Myungbak were selected by much fewer citizens.

Figure 8: Public Opinion of National Security Performance by each President from 1998 through 2016 (Question: Which government performed best on national security?)



Source: Shindonga <http://shindonga.donga.com/3/home/13/767020/1>¹⁷

¹⁷ The monthly magazine “Shindonga” referred to the survey conducted by Embrain, an online research firm in South Korea. Embrain surveyed surveyed 1,000 South Korean adult citizens of the wide range of generations during the period of September 27-28, 2016.
(source: <http://shindonga.donga.com/3/home/13/767020/1>)

3.3. Conclusion of Case Analysis

After analysis using the framework of human-centric national security, my conclusion on South Korea is that more human-centric approaches produced more effective engagement policies and were more effective for controlling North Korea's military threats, which are currently the only military threats to South Korea. Citizens' perspectives on human security are related to data such as the number of South Koreans (soldiers or civilians) killed or kidnapped by North Korea, as well as how South Koreans feel about their security and peace. Based on the data above, the active engagement policy seems to have produced better outputs for *security consumers*. It should also be noted that North Korea's NPT withdrawal (2003) and its first nuclear test (2006) were not directly related to South Korea's active engagement policies. The two provocations by North Korea were responses to the Bush administration's hardline approach, not to South Korea's liberal engagement.

This finding may be surprising to those who associate "hawkish" approaches with "strong national security." Indeed, when judged according to traditional metrics for measuring military power, such as weapon stockpiles or military budgets, national defense might appear to be stronger under hardline administrations. However, in the case of South Korea, one paradox of rhetoric is that the rhetoric surrounding a particular policy has frequently produced outputs opposite to the original policy intentions. For example, the more official talk of unification there is, the less inter-Korean dialogue there is. Based on the framework of human-centric national security, this gap can be attributed to a lack of cognitive empathy towards the opponent – in this case, North Korea.

Therefore, the gap between human security *demand* and *supply* is explained more clearly through the framework of human-centric national security than through traditional security frameworks. As such, a policy approach that integrates human-centric security into national security is likely to improve a national government's provision of security for its citizens.

4. Conclusion and Policy Implication

The main purpose of this paper is to bring the “human” back into the study of national security, which is inclined towards *macrosecurity* frameworks focused on state regimes. The human-centric national security framework highlights the fact, often forgotten by national security strategists, that the real world is not a chess board on which chess pieces have no will, no life, and no imagination. National security analysts must avoid the trap of unitary actor models, which “[liken] international politics to chess” (Moore, 2014), because in reality, humans can build their own futures and change the rules of the game in their society.

The conceptual integration of human security and national security is particularly useful for strong states. The “strong state,” by definition, retains the power of legitimacy – citizens’ trust in political institutions – and most importantly, a monopoly on organized violence and security resources. My framework of human-centric national security is intended to *enhance* the effectiveness of the state and its legitimacy as an institution for human security.

While I uphold the state’s legitimate function of monopolizing organized violence, I dissect the concept of “human security” using the original logic of “security” in human society. As a result, I identify three dimensions of human security: “security *of* humans,” “security *for* humans,” and “security *by* humans.” My new framework, human-centric national security, can help national security authorities understand and reduce the gaps between human security *demand* and national security *supply* for their citizens. These three dimensions are not exclusive to each other, but rather are, each of them, indispensable for the framework of human-centric national security.

With respect to the application of the human-centric national security framework, the case of South Korea reveals two contrasting facts: First, with regard to policy intentions, the concept of “human security” (though not the term itself) can be widely found in the national security policies of South Korean governments, both liberal and conservative, all of which recognized human security threats in their national security strategies and doctrines. It is also clear that every president has recognized the mission to provide national security *for* citizens, and the South Korean government has become increasingly aware of “new,” “comprehensive” threats to the nation. Concepts like “security policies for the safety of citizens,” “peace and reconciliation,” “engagement with North Korea,” and “humanitarian support for North Korean 'brothers',” in addition to traditional concepts like “military deterrence” and “denuclearization,” have undoubtedly been central to South Korea’s national security policies. Second, in spite of all the presidents’ shared awareness of the demand for human security, those same presidents have produced very different outputs. Certain presidents’ failure to provide citizens with a high level of security corresponds to a low level of human-centric national security in their security policies and strategies.

Human-centric national security is also a reminder of the rationale underlying the creation of the United Nations during World War II. The 1942 “Declaration by the United Nations” was based on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech of January 1941 (Plesch, 2011). Plesch observes that Roosevelt’s prime concern was a *realist* one – to win

the war against the Axis – while Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, particularly “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” inspired the *liberal* advocates of “human security” in the 1990s. He and Churchill set out the values that people would be willing to fight for: human rights, free trade, social security, the rights of labor, and a new system of international security (*ibid.*). This *liberal* approach was originally a national security strategy to defeat Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese warlords, and it proved highly successful (*ibid.*). From this example, it is clear that liberal values that are understood today as “human security” can provide a strong foundation for national security.

The human-centric national security framework also reminds human security scholars of the underdeveloped potential value of “human security” by freeing the concept from its heretofore narrow scope of application (i.e., only to weak states and “soft” security). In this paper, I have expounded an innovative framework in which human security is not a “dead” concept, but rather an invaluable core element in dramatically improving the “service quality” of national security institutions in the face of *new* types of threats as well as *old* ones.

Nevertheless, this paper is only a starting point, and will likely lead to many more empirical studies, more case studies, and more sophisticated theory discussions in the future – ideally, with many other scholars and people in the field. In particular, strong states such as the United States, China, and Japan, need to be analyzed with the same framework in the future, so that we may develop a more general human-centric theory about the national security of strong states.

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